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CHAPTER 13 
Labor Law 
WILLIAM T. SHERRY, JR.O) 
§13.1. Introduction. Chapter 150E of the General Laws gives most 
employees of the commonwealth and its political subdivisions the right 
of self-organization and the right to form, join, or assist any employee 
organization for the purpose of bargaining collectively through their 
representatives on questions of wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment,1 Any collective bargaining agreement reached 
between a public employer and the exclusive bargaining representative 
of its employees must be reduced to writing and executed by the 
parties.2 The normal mechanism agreed on by the parties for enforcing 
the terms of such an agreement is final and binding arbitration. In this 
regard, chapter 150E, section 8, provides: "The parties may include in 
any written agreement a grievance procedure culminating in final and 
binding arbitration to be invoked in the event of any dispute concerning 
the interpretation or application of such written agreement." 3 Most 
collective bargaining agreements in the public sector, like those in the 
private sector, do contain such a provision.4 
In the private sector, arbitrators have tremendous authority to inter-
pret collective bargaining agreements and to fashion remedies when a 
0) WILLIAM T. SHERRY, JR. is a senior partner in the firm of Nutter, Mc-
Clennan & Fish, Boston. 
§13.1. 1 C.L. c. 150E, § 2. 
2 C.L. c. 150E, § 7. 
3 C.L. c. 150E, § 8. 
4 A public employer's decision to agree to the inclusion of such a proVlSlon 
in bargaining agreements undoubtedly is influenced by C.L. c. 150E, § 8. This 
section provides that in the absence of a grievance procedure culminating in a 
final and binding arbitration, arbitration may be ordered by the Massachusetts Labarr 
Relations Commission. The National Labor Relations Aot, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 
(1976 & Supp. III 1979), the cornerstone of private sector collective bargaining, 
does not contain a counterpart permitting the National Labor Relations Board to 
order binding arbitration when the bargaining agreement contains no arbitration 
provision. In order partially to neutralize the right to strike enjoyed by private 
sector unions, but not by unions in the public sector, binding arbitration clauses 
are most always negotiated into public sector collective bargaining agreements. 
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breach is found; conversely, courts reviewing such awards have very 
limited power. 5 As the United States Supreme Court has recognized: 
The function of the court is very limited when the parties have 
agreed to submit all the questions of contract interpretation to the 
arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking 
arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the 
contract. Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a ques-
tion of contract interpretation for the arbitrator. . . . 
The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits of 
the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular 
claim, or determining whether there is particular language in the 
written instrument which will support the claim. The agreement 
is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those which 
the court will deem meritorious. The processing of even frivolous 
claims may have therapeutic values of which those who are not 
part of the plant environment may be quite unaware.6 
The Supreme Court has also made it clear that with respect to private 
sector bargaining agreements, arbitrators have great latitude in fashion-
ing remedies when contract violations are found.7 
Clauses mandating binding arbitration are similarly worded in both 
private and public sector collective bargaining agreements. The valid-
ity, enforceability, and effect of such agreements under Massachusetts 
law are governed by the same statute.8 Nevertheless, it is clear from 
decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court that an arbitrator's authority 
is more limited when he is interpreting and enforcing a public sector 
collective bargaining agreement than when he is dealing with a private 
sector agreement. The Court has recognized that there exists a "ten-
sion" between (1) the terms of a lawfully authorized collective bargain-
ing agreement requiring a public employer to submit disputes to final 
and binding arbitration, and (2) the statutory authority of such public 
5 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 
593 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Culf Navigation Co., 363 
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. AllJeil'ican Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 
564 (1960). 
6 Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-68 (citations omitted). 
7 As the Court wrote in Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf, 
[w]hen an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective bar-
gaining agreement, he is to bring informed judgment to bear in order to reach 
a fair solution to a problem. This is especially true when it comes to formulat-
ing remedies. There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide variety of 
situations. 
363 U.S. at 597. 
8 See C.L. c. 15OC. 
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employers to make particular decisionsY In considering problems gen-
erated by such tension, the Court has recognized that the freedom to 
contract in the private sector does not blanket certain public sector 
matters, because of the governmental interests and public concerns 
which may be involved.lO In the Court's view, "[p]ublic policy, whether 
derived from, and whether explicit or implicit in statute or decisional 
law, or in neither," may limit a public employer's ability to bind itself 
to a given contractual provision or to delegate to an arbitrator the 
power to bind it. ll Thus, in considering the scope of an arbitrator's 
power in interpreting public sector collective bargaining agreements, 
the Supreme Judicial Court has held, in Berkshire Hills Regional School 
District Committee v. Berkshire Hills Education Association,12 that a 
court must inquire whether the matter before the arbitrator involves 
a decision within the sole and exclusive authority of the public em-
ployer,13 If so, the matter cannot lawfully be the subject of arbitration.14 
The above principle may be applied in various contexts-in unfair 
labor practice proceedings before the Labor Relations Commission, in 
actions to stay arbitration under chapter 15OC, section 2 (b), or in ac-
tions to vacate or confirm arbitral awards under chapter 150C, section 
10. The Court has held that in all of these instances the analysis should 
essentially be the same: "whether the ingredient of public policy in 
the issue subject to dispute is so comparatively heavy that collective 
bargaining, and even voluntary arbitration, on the subject is, as a matter 
of law, to be denied effect." 15 During the Survey year, it became ap-
parent that the "tension" that exists between certain provisions in col-
lective bargaining agreements and public policy is not always easy to 
diagnose and cure. 
§13.2. Arbitral Authority in Public Sector Disputes-Teacher Sala-
ries. In School Committee of Burlington v. Burlington Educators Asso-
ciation,1 the school committee brought an action to stay arbitration of 
two grievances filed by the Burlington Educators Association, the col-
lective bargaining representative of the teachers. The following facts 
underlay these grievances. Having begun the 1972-73 school year 
9 School Comm. of Danvers v. Tyrnan, 372 Mass. 106, 109, 360 N.E.2d 877, 
878-79 (1977). 
10 School Conun. of Hanover v. Curry, 369 Mass. 683, 684, 343 N.E.2d 144, 145 
(1976). 
11 Id. 
12 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1715, 377 N.E.2d 940. 
13 Id. at 1718-24, 377 N.E.2d at 943-44. 
14 Id. at 1724, 377 N.E.2d at 945. 
15 School Comm. of Boston v. Boston Teachers Union, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1238, 
1244-45, 389 N.E.2d 970, 973. 
§13.2. 1 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 165, 385 N.E.2d 1014. 
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without a collective bargaining agreement, a majority of the teachers 
in the association voted to go on strike to enforce its contract demands.2 
The strike commenced on September 20, 1972. Not all of the teachers 
followed the strike vote, and the committee was able to keep the schools 
open. On September 29, the eighth scheduled school day following the 
commencement of the strike, a superior court judge, acting at the behest 
of a group of parents of Burlington students, issued a temporary re-
straining order requiring the committee to close the schools for the 
duration of the strike.~ As a result of this order, schools were closed 
on October 2 and 3. On October 3, the association and the committee 
entered into a two-year collective bargaining agreement, effective retro-
actively to September 1, 1972.4 The restraining order was dissolved 
on that day, and normal operation of the school system resumed on 
October 4.5 
In January of 1973, the committee docked the pay of each teacher 
who had participated in the strike in an amount equivalent to ten days' 
pay. G The association subsequently filed two grievances relating to this 
action. The parties were unable to resolve these grievances informally, 
and they were taken to binding arbitration by the association under 
the terms of the bargaining agreement.7 
In its first grievance, the. association complained of the committee's 
holding back of ten days' salary from the striking teachers. It sought 
a decision: (1) allowing teachers to work their guaranteed number of 
days; (2) allowing each teacher to obtain his guaranteed annual salary 
as specified in the bargaining agreement; and (3) mandating the com-
mittee and the association to negotiate a rescheduling of a sufficient 
number of days to accommodate the first two remedies.8 
A superior court judge granted the school committee's application to 
stay the arbitration of this grievance.9 On appeal by the association, 
2 ld. at 166, 385 N.E.2d at 1015. 
3 ld. 
4 ld. The agreement provided, inter alia, ,that the work year of teachers cov-
ered by the agreement's salary schedule should be no more than 185 work days, 
and that in calculating deductions for unauthorized absences, one day would be 
considered 1/185 of the annual contract amount. ld. at 167, 385 N.E.2d at 1016. 
In a supplement, the agreement further provided that all questions concerning the 
number of days a Burlington school should be opened must be submitted to the 
State Board of Education and that the parties must abide by the Board's de,termina-
tions on this issue. ld. Finally, the agreement established a four-step grievance 
procedure, culminating in binding arbitration under the auspices of the American 
Arbitration Association. ld. 
5 ld. at 166-67, 385 N.E.2d at 1015. 
6 ld. at 168, 385 N.E.2d at 1016. 
7 ld. at 169, 385 N.E.2d at 1016. 
8 ld. at 169-70, 385 N.E.2d at 1017. 
9 ld. at 166, 385 N.E.2d at 1015. 
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the Appeals Court, after a careful recitation of the facts, found that the 
first and third remedies sought by the association asked the arbitrator, 
in effect, to determine the number of days which striking teachers 
should be permitted to work, and thus the number of school days that 
the schools should remain open.10 The court noted that the power to 
determine the number of days that school should be open in any school 
year is statutorily reserved to a school committeeY Citing the general 
rule set forth in Berkshire Hills 12 that "matters of educational policy 
which are committed or reserved to a school committee by [chapter 71, 
section 37] cannot be lawfully delegated to an arbitrator for a decision 
by him," 13 the Appeals Court concluded that the arbitrator was without 
power to grant the first and third remedies sought by the association 
under its initial grievance.14 
With respect to the second remedy sought by the association under 
the first grievance-an order allowing each teacher to obtain his guar-
anteed annual salary as specified in the bargaining agreement-the 
Appeals Court noted that it could be interpreted in two different ways. 
It could be construed either as a request that the arbitrator order the 
school committee to pay teachers for scheduled school days during 
which they were on strike, or as a request that the arbitrator order the 
committee to pay them for days that were added on to the end of the 
school year by the committee in order to complete the state-mandated 
minimum number of school days.15 With respect to the first interpreta-
tion, the court noted that strikes by public employees are illegal under 
the laws of the commonwealth; thus, it would be against public policy 
for a school committee to compensate teachers for days that they were 
on strike.16 The court observed that for the same reason it would be 
unlawful for an arbitrator to order the committee to make such a pay-
ment. The Appeals Court concluded that under the associations's sec-
ond request, the lower court judge did not err in staying the arbitra-
10 ld. at 170, 385 N.E.2d at 1017. 
11 ld. C.L. c. 71, § 37, provides in part that the school oommittee "may deter-
mine, subject to this chapter, the number of weeks and the hours during which such 
schools shall be in session, . . ." (emphasis added). The Appeals Court specifically 
cited this provision to support its oonclusion that the number of school days per 
year was a decision reserved to the committee. ld. at 170 n.4, 385 N .E.2d at 1017 
n.4. This being the case, it would appear to follow that the hours when school 
is in session (and thus the hours during which te.achers work) is also a matter 
reserved to the committee. But see C.L. c. 15OE, §§ 2 and 10, which require the 
committee to bargain about hours of work. 
12 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1715, 377 N.E.2d 940; see § 1, text and notes at notes 
12-14, supra. 
13 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 170, 385 N.E.2d at 1017. 
14 ld. at 170-71, 385 N.E.2d at 1017. 
15 ld. at 171-72, 385 N.E.2d at 1017-18. 
161d. 
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tion.n The court then addressed the other possible interpretation. It 
noted that there is no statutory provision evidencing a public policy 
against paying teachers for work done on days tacked onto the end 
of a school year to satisfy minimum day requirements imposed by the 
state.18 In the court's view, if an arbitrator were to accept this inter-
pretation, there would be no obstacle to arbitrability of that claim.19 
The association's second grievance was directed specifically toward 
the committee's action in docking the striking teachers' pay for the two 
days schools were closed pursuant to the temporary restraining order.20 
Based on the record before the Appeals Court, it was unclear whether 
the association was asking the arbitrator to order the committee to re-
schedule those two days or whether the teachers were asking the arbitra-
tor to order the committee to pay them for those two days because they 
were not on strike on either day, but rather were the "unwilling victims 
of a court-ordered lockout." 21 The court explained that under either 
interpretation, the arbitration properly was stayed. Under the former 
interpretation, the association was asking the arbitrator to infringe on 
the number of days school should remain open.22 As it had revealed 
in its discussion of the association's first grievance, the Appeals Court 
refused to permit such an infringement. 23 With respect to the second 
interpretation, the court held that there was no genuine dispute con-
cerning whether the teachers were on strike on October 2 and 3.24 
Again, as it had held earlier, the court concluded that it was proper to 
stay the arbitration, since the remedy sought-an order to pay the 
teachers for the days they were on strike-would be against public 
policy and illegal.25 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Appeals Court remanded the 
case to the superior court to determine whether there was a "contro-
versy" under chapter 150C, section 2(b) (2). If such a controversy 
were found to exist, the lower court would have to modify its judgment 
to require arbitration concerning that controversy. 26 The Appeals Court 
made it clear that only the second remedy sought in the association's 
17 Id. at 172-73, 385 N.E.2d at 1018. 
18 Id. at 173-74, 385 N.E.2d at 1018-19. The then effective regulations of the 
State Board of Education required every school committee to schedu1e not less than 
185 days per school year. Id. at 167 n.2, 385 N.E.2d at 1016 n.2. 
19 Id. at 174, 385 N.E.2d at 1019. 
20 Id. at 174-75,385 N.E.2d at 1019. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 175, 385 N.E.2d at 1019. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 176, 385 N.E.2d at 1019. 
2~ Id. 
26 Id. at 176-77, 385 N.E.2d at 1019. 
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first grievance arguably presented such a controversy.27 Presumably, 
only if the remedy sought was interpreted to be an order requiring 
the committee to pay the teachers for days added on to the end of the 
school year, could the issue be considered arbitrable. 
§13.3. Arbitral Authority in Public Sector Disputes-Employee 
Fringe Benefits. The decision in School Committee of Burlington evi-
dences the major problem created by Berkshire Hills. Following Berk-
shire Hills, a court must examine in great detail (1) an often incomplete 
set of facts that might be submitted to the arbitrator, l (2) the collective 
bargaining contract, (3) the statutes of the commonwealth, and (4) 
public policy. The court must then determine whether an arbitrator 
can, pursuant to his power to identify and define grievances,2 construe 
the moving party's demand for arbitration as permitting an award that 
could possibly be consistent with statutes and public policy. Such an 
analysis of "possibilities" is an extremely time consuming and difficult 
duty for the courts. 
The difficulty of such an analysis was further evidenced in School 
Committee of Holyoke v. Duprey,3 where the Appeals Court relied on 
School Committee of Burlington in affirming the judgment of the superior 
court vacating an arbitrator's award found to be against public policy. 
In School Committee of Holyoke, the committee had signed a bargaining 
agreement with the teachers under which it agreed to contribute sixty-
five percent of the teachers' health insurance premiums. This contribu-
tion was fifteen percent higher than that permitted by the General 
Laws.4 During the term of the contract, the city treasurer, following 
orders of the mayor, reduced the school committee's contribution to 
fifty percent. As a result of this reduction, the teachers commenced 
grievance proceedings pursuant to the colleotive bargaining contract. Ii 
After a hearing, the arbitrator found in the teachers' favor and ordered 
27 ld. 
§13.3. 1 The Appeals Court in School Committee of Burlington noted that the 
record was silent on a critical issue, whether the striking teachers were paid for 
working on days which the committee may have tacked onto the Originally scheduled 
school closing dates. 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 168, 173, 385 N.E.2d at 
1016, 1018. 
2 Wachusett Regional Dist. Sch. Cornrn. v. Wachusett Regional Teachers Ass'n, 
1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 161, 373 N.E.2d 235. 
3 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1481, 391 N.E.2d 925. 
4 C.L. c. 32B, § 7a, as then in dfect, provided that the public employee pay 
50% of the health insurance premium, while the governmental unit was required to 
pay the remaining 50%. The statute contained a provision permitting the govern-
mental unit to contribute a higher percentage if so voted by ,the city. 1979 Mass. 
App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1424, 391 N.E.2d at 927-28. The city of Holyoke had never 
accepted this provision. 
5 ld. at 1419, 391 N.E.2d at 926. 
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the school committee to reimburse the teachers the fifteen percent addi-
tional contribution.6 The school committee commenced an action under 
chapter 15OC, section 11 (a) (3), seeking to vacate the arbitrator's award, 
and a superior court judge granted the requested relief.7 
On appeal, the association argued to the Appeals Court that there 
was a crucial distinction in this case between an arbitrator's award of 
money damages and an arbitrator's order to perform an illegal act,s 
The association contended ,that School Committee of Burlington was not 
controlling, because the arbitrator had not specifically ordered the school 
committee to pay the higher premiums, but rather had only ordered it 
to reimburse the teachers for the difference between the fifty and sixty-
five percent contribution rates. The court disagreed: 
The public policy limitation upon contracts concerning govern-
mental contributions to insure premiums must prevail, and it can-
not be frustrated by awarding the contributions but under a dif-
ferent label. "This case exemplifies a well understood principle--
that mere characterization of a feature of a collective bargain or 
an arbitration award as 'compensation,' or 'terms or conditions of 
employment' or some other subject conventionally or by law within 
the scope of either process, will not save the provision if in sub-
stance it defeats a declared legislative purpose." 9 
The association also maintained that the arbitrator's award of monetary 
damages was proper because the school committee had breached its 
duty under the bargaining agreement to "take such other action as may 
be necessary in order to give full force and effect to the provisions of 
this contmct," 10 The association noted that the arbitrator had found 
that the record did not indioate that the committee had made any effort 
to secure aoceptance by the city of Holyoke of the higher contribution 
rate. In support of its argument, the association cited Mendes v. City 
of Taunton,11 where ,the Supreme Judicial Court found that the mayor 
of Taunton was required to seek an appropriation in order to fund a 
collective bargaining agreement for employees of that city. The Ap-
peals Court distinguished Mendes as involving a purely "ministerial" 
act involving no exercise of a policy-making function.12 The court 
characterized the issue subject to arbitration in School Committee of 
Holyoke-whether the city should vote to accept the statutory provision 
6Id. 
7 Id. 
SId. at 1424-25, 391 N.E.2d at 938. 
9 Id. at 1427-28, 391 N.E.2d at 929 (citation omitted). 
10 Id. at 1426, 391 N.E.2d at 928. 
11 376 Mass. 109, 315 N.E.2d 865 (1974). 
12 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1426-27, 391 N.E.2d at 928-29. 
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allowing a higher contribution to premiums-as a matter of municipal 
policy.13 The Appeals Court concluded that Mendes was not controlling, 
since the issue in the present case, involving a matter of public policy 
which has been enunciated by statute,14 was one on which the school 
committee could not agreed to be bound.15 
§13.4. Arbitral Authority in Public Sector Disputes-Police Com-
missioner Authority to Withhold Service Revolver. The asssociation's 
argument in City of Holyoke is indicative of a trend toward defending 
an arbitration award by asking the courts to analyze the remedy rather 
than the issue submitted to the arbitrator. Another example during the 
Survey year of the use of such an argument is found in City of Boston 
v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Association,1 where the city of Boston 
commenced an action pursuant to chapter 150C, section 11, seeking to 
vacate an arbitrator's award ordering the police commissioner to re-
issue a service revolver to a police officer. In 1972, after he had threat-
ened three civilians with his service revolver while intoxicated and off 
duty, a police officer was suspended by the commissioner for a period 
of one year, followed by a one-year probationary period.2 During the 
probationary period, the officer conducted himself in an exemplary 
manner while serving in an administrative clerical capadty.3 It also 
appeared that he had overcome his problem with alcoho1.4 Based on 
the foregOing, upon completion of the probationary period, the officer 
requested police officials to reissue his service revolver so that he would 
be eligible for overtime assignments and paid details.5 The police com-
missioner refused to return the service revolver to the officer,6 :asserting 
that it was his statutory prerogative and responsibility to control the 
issuance of a weapon to a police officer.7 
An arbitrator found that the decision not to reissue the service revolver 
to the police officer at the completion of his suspension and probationary 
period constituted extended punishment and that the collective bargain-
18 Id. 
14 Id. at 1427, 391 N.E.2d at 929. 
15 Id. 
§13.4. 1 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1644, 392 N.E.2d 1202. 
2 Id. at 1645, 392 N.E.2d at 1204. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 1645-46, 392 N.E.2d at 1204. Paid private details and certain overtime 
duties are assigned only to armed police officers. 
6 Id. The office.r had agreed to a physical examination, and the physician 
referred him to a psychiatrist for evaluation. The officer refused this psychiatric 
examination. 
7 Id. Under the Acts of 1906, c. 291, § 11, the police commissioner has general 
control over the administration of the police department, while section 14 specifically 
provides that he shall have the power to determine which weapons police officers 
shall carry. Id. at 1647 n.3, 392 N.E.2d at 1204 n.2. 
9
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ing agreement did not provide for such a sanction in this case.S The 
arbitrator concluded that the commissioner lacked authority to withhold 
the revolver, and he ordered the commissioner to return the gun to the 
officer.9 The arbitrator also found that the bargaining agreement re-
quired a fair and equitable distribution of overtime assignments and 
paid details among those officers within a district who requested such 
work. 1 0 He ordered the city to pay the officer an amount equal to 
what he would have earned by participating in such extra work from 
the date his probationary period ended,11 
Following the arbitrator's decision, the Patrolmen's Association, the 
bargaining representative of ,the police officer, moved to confinn the 
award in superior court.12 ~he superior court judge entered an order 
allowing the motion for confirmation, and the city appealed.13 No 
judgment had been entered by the lower court, however, and the Ap-
peals Court dismissed the appeal.14 Because the issue had been fully 
briefed and argued, and in view of the possibility that the city might 
move for a rehearing on an association's motion, the Appeals Court 
decided to express its views regarding the matters.II1 
The Appeals Court framed the issue as one of whether the police 
commissioner's denial of a weapon to an officer, which concomitantly 
resulted in the deprivation of overtime asSignments and paid details for 
the officer, was a proper dispute for arbitration.16 Citing Fiberboard 
Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,H the court initially noted that "[f]ew 
subjects, if any, in the realm of labor relations present themselves singu-
larly or unattached to other concerns." IS The ,court then reasoned that 
when an arbitral award mandates actions by an employer, and those 
actions touch upon both subjects of arbitration and subjects of "policy," 
then a court should employ a balancing test to determine the legal effect 
of the award.19 The court noted that an arbitration award cannot stand 
if the "policy ingredient" in the issue subject to arbitration is so com-
paratively heavy that collective bargaining on the subject is to be denied 
8 ld. at 1648, 392 N.E.2d at 1205. 
91d. 
10 ld. 
11 ld. The city's appellate brief did not address <the issue pertaining to the 
award of overtime asSignment and paid-detail earnings. The Appeals Court, there-
fore, treated this issue as waive.d and focused exclusively on the power of the 
arbitrator to order ,the reissuance of the officer's revolver. ld. 
12 ld. at 1644, 392 N.E.2d at 1203. 
13 ld. 
14 ld. 
15 ld. at 1645, 392 N.E.2d at 1203-04. 
16 ld. at 1649, 392 N.E.2d at 1205. See note 11 supra. 
17 397 U.S. 203, 223 (1964). 
18 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1650, 392 N.E.2d at 1205. 
19 ld. at 1650, 392 N.E.2d at 1206. 
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effect as a matter of law.20 Analyzing the facts of the case at bar, the 
court concluded that policy considerations concerning the issuance of a 
weapon far outweigh any other concern.21 The Appeals Court explained 
that the Massachusetts legislature had determined that decisions con-
cerning who shall carry a firearm and under what conditions should 
be made by the heads of law enforcement agencies. 22 The court ob-
served that "[t]he concerns of public officials should reflect those of 
the public, and its safety cannot be placed on the bargaining table as 
if it were a subject open to compromise and negotiation." 23 The Ap-
peals Court concluded that in this case the commissioner was motivated 
by a legitimate concern for public safety.24 Accordingly, the court held 
that the arbitrator's award that the officer's service revolver be returned 
to him was in excess of his powers within the meaning of chapter 15OC, 
section 11 (a)( 3) .25 
Shortly after its decision in Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, the 
Appeals Court had occasion to consider the limitations of that decision. 
In Mayor of Somerville v. Caliguri,26 the police chief denied a black 
officer a service revolver and then assigned him to foot patrol in an area 
where he had previously met with open hostility from the residents. 
The officer refused these assignments; consequently, he was listed as 
"absent without leave," thereby losing his salary, benefits, and seniority.27 
This matter was eventually submitted to binding arbitration under the 
applicable collective bargaining contract, and the arbitrator awarded 
the officer his back pay and ordered his reinstatement with full accumu-
lated seniority. 28 The city moved to vacate the award pursuant to 
chapter I5OC, section 11. The superior court judge denied the city's 
motion and confirmed the award. The city appealed.29 
Noting that its review of an arbitration award is limited, the Appeals 
Court determined that the only issue before it was whether the arbitrator 
ordered relief which was beyond his power to grant.30 The city con-
20 ld. at 1650-51, 392 N.E.2d at 1206. 
21 ld. at 1651, 392 N.E.2d at 1206. 
22 ld. (citing several statutes reflecting the legislature's determination on this 
issue ). 
23 ld. at 1652, 392 N.E.2d at 1206. 
24 ld. at 1654, 392 N.E.2d at 1207. The court indicated that it would have 
reached a different result if it had found that the commissioner's action was "a 
pretense or de.vice activated by personal hostility," rather than an action motivated 
by a legitimate concern for safety. ld. 
25 ld. Since there was no judgment in the case, however, the court dismissed 
the appeal. ld. See text at notes 14-15 supra. 
26 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1802, 393 N.E.2d 958. 
27 ld. at 1802-03, 393 N.E.2d at 959. 
28 ld. 
29 ld. 
30 ld. at 1803, 393 N.E.2d at 959. 
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tended that Boston Police Patrolmen's Association 31 controlled and that 
on the basis of that decision, the arbitrator had exceeded his authority. 
The court rejected the city's argument for two reasons. First, the court 
conC'eded that Boston Police Patrolmen's Association prohibits an arbitra-
tor from disturbing a police chief's legislative grant of authority to 
determine which officers shall carry what weapons.32 The court ex-
plained, however, that the arbitral award in the present case did not 
require the chief to issue a service revolver to the officer.33 It merely 
awarded the officer lost compensation and benefits and ordered him 
reinstated with full and accumulated seniority. 34 The court thus held 
that the award was not in conflict with the authority vested by the 
statute in the police chief.35 
The Appeals Court determined that Boston Police Patrolmen's Asso-
ciation did not compel staying the award for a second reason. The 
court explained that in its earlier decision, it had held that the decision 
of an official who is legislatively vested with the power to determine 
who shall carry firearms shall not be disturbed by an arbitrator, in the 
absence of a shoWing that the official has abuiSed his managerial pow-
ers.SO The court's review of the facts, as found by the arbitrator, re-
vealed that the Somerville police chief had abused his managerial 
authority. The chief had assigned the officer to an area where his 
safety would be endangered without his service revolver, despite the 
chief's determination that the revolver was equipment necessary for the 
performance of that assignment.a7 These faots had led the arbitrator 
to characterize the chief's actions as "arbitrary, capricious and blatantly 
discriminatory," and in violation of the bargaining agreement.3S In the 
view of the Appeals Court, the chief's action was an "imposition of a 
sentence rather than an exercise of his managerial powers to issue weap-
ons and make job assignments.39 The court further found that the chief's 
asserted use of statutory power was nothing more than "a pretense of 
device activated by a concern which is far removed from the efficiency 
and integrity of the police department." 40 Since the police chief had 
abused his managerial powers, and since the arbitral award did not 
31 City of Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. 
Sh. 1644, 392 N.E.2d 1202. See text and notes at notes 1-25 supra. 
32 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1806, 393 N.E.2d at 960. 
33 Id. at 1807, 393 N.E.2d at 961. 
34 Id. at 1808, 393 N.E.2d at 961. 
35 Id. at 1807, 393 N.E.2d at 961. 
36 Id. at 1803-04, 393 N.E.2d at 959. 
37 Id. at 1806, 393 N.E.2d at 960. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 1807, 393 N.E.2d at 961. 
40 Id. 
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order the chief to return the gun to the prosecutor, the court allowed 
the award to stand.41 
A review of the analysis adopted in School Committee of Holyoke, 
Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, and Mayor of Somerville, illus-
trates some of the additional problems confronting the courts when they 
determine the validity of arbitration awards interpreting public sector 
collective bargaining agreements. Not only must a court analyze the 
issue submitted to the arbitrator to determine whether it conflicts with 
public policy,42 but it also must analyze the arbitrator's award for the 
same purpose.43 If the award does not on its face require the public 
employer to perform an act contrary to public policy, it does not nec-
essarily follow that the award must be enforced. A court must further 
examine the award to determine whether it "frustrates" public policy 
by affording improper relief under a "different label." 44 Thus, in many 
cases a court, under a rubric of "public policy," must engage in an 
analysis of matters that are very similar to those that arbitrators his-
torically have examined. 
§13.5. Arbitral Authority in Public Sector Disputes-School Commit-
tee Examination Policy. In School Committee of Boston v. Boston Teach-
ers Union, Local 66 1 the Supreme Judicial Court again was asked to con-
sider the legal barriers imposed on judiCial enforcement of arbitration 
awards arising from public sector collective bargaining agreements. In 
School Committee of Boston, the union and the committee were parties 
to a collective bargaining agreement effective from September 1, 1976, 
through August 31, 1978. Article X of that agreement provided that 
"[ w ]ith respeot to matters not covered by this Agreement which are 
proper subjects for collective bargaining the Committee agrees it will 
make no changes without prior consultation and negotiation with the 
union." 2 In May of 1977, without prior consultation and negotiations 
with the union, the committee implemented a new policy of holding 
elementary school final examinations.3 As a result of the committee's 
unilateral action, the union processed a grievance in accordance with 
the collective bargaining agreement and eventually presented its case 
to binding arbitration.4 The arbitrator determined that the final exam-
ination proposal was a proper subject for bargaining and, therefore, 
subject to the advance consultation requirement under Article X of the 
41Id. 
42 See § 2 supra. 
43 See § 3 supra. 
44 See § 3, at note 9, supra. 
§13.5. 1 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1238, 389 N.E.2d 970. 
2 Id. at 1239, 389 N.E.2d at 971. 
3 Id. at 1239-40, 389 N.E.2d at 971. 
4 Id. at 1240, 389 N.E.2d at 971. 
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labor agreement.5 He ordered the committee to bargain with the 
union.6 The parties concurrently filed motions to vacate and confirm 
the arbitral award. A superior court judge deemed that the award was 
invalid as a matter of law on the ground that it would unduly infringe 
on the exclusive prerogative of the committee to establish or change 
educational policy.7 The union appealed, and the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted its application for direct appellate review.s 
At the outset, the Court noted that the issue before it was a narrow 
one: whether the arbitrator's award directing the committee to consult 
with the union prior to implementing the final examination policy sub-
stantially interfered with the school committee's ability to formulate and 
administer educational policy. n Thus, the Court reasoned, it was not 
called upon to determine whether the union's grievance was arbitrable 
under the labor agreement,lO or whether the arbitrator erred in his 
interpretation of the relevant contractual provisions.u The Court as-
sumed, arguendo, that the decision to hold final examinations was a 
management prerogative and thus beyond the scope of collective bar-
gaining.12 The Court then explained: 
However, even where certain ultimate decisions may have been 
deemed to be so laced with educational policy as to be beyond the 
reach of bargaining and arbitration, we have upheld arbitral awards 
which have merely involved questions of adherence by the school 
committee to procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agree-
ment for resolving such determinations.1s 
The Court went on to examine the question submitted to the arbitrator, 
emphasizing that it was not whether the committee could unilaterally 
institute the final examinations,14 but rather merely whether there had 
been a violation of agreed-to procedures in implementing the examina-
tions without consulting the union.15 The Court explained that the 
arbitral award did no more than order the committee to refrain from 




old. at 1238-39, 389 N.E.2d at 971. "Because there are subjects which no 
school committee is free to bargain away .to a union or delegate to an arbitrator, 
arbitral awards concerning these issues are subject to judicial examination. If an 
award violates this principle, it should be vacated." Id. 
10 Id. at 1242, 389 N.E.2d at 972. 
11 Id. at 1243, 389 N.E.2d at 972. 
12 Id. at 1246-47, 389 N.E.2d at 947. 
1S I d. (emphasis in original). 
14 Id. at 1248, 389 N.E.2d at 975. The Court indicated that this question is 
"heavily laden" with policy considerations. Id. 
15 Id. 
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implementing the final examination policy without first consulting with 
the union; it in no way prohibited the committee from ultimately insti-
tuting such a policy.16 Based on the foregoing, the Court reversed the 
judgment of the lower court and remanded the case with instructions 
that the award be confirmedY 
While Boston School Committee evidences the previously-discussed 
difficulties courts have in analyzing public sector arbitration awards, it 
also highlights a further problem. The Court in that case examined the 
arbitral award in detail and concluded that it was enforceable since it 
did not substantially affect the committee's ultimate prerogative to in-
stitute a final examination policy, but rather only mandated adherence 
to agreed-on procedures. The Court, however, noted in this regard that: 
[w]hile we do not foreclose the possibility that a clause of this nature 
might in some instances improperly obstruct the freedom of a school 
committee to promulgate and administer educational policy, noth-
ing in this record suggests that adherence to its minimal bargaining 
obligation poses any threat to the committee's ability to freely de-
velop policy here. 1s 
It thus would appear that not only must the courts examine an arbitra-
tion award to determine whether it is consistent with the statutes of the 
commonwealth and its public policy. They also must analyze an award 
that on its face is enforceable to determine whether it "poses any threat" 
to prerogatives reserved to the public employer. If it does, it appears 
that the court must further analyze the award to determine whether the 
intrusion into those prerogatives is likely to benefit the employer or 
hinder it.19 
§13.6. Conclusion. It is clear from these cases decided during the 
Survey year that because of the "tension" that exists between the terms 
of a collective bargaining agreement requiring a public employer to 
submit disputes to final and binding arbitration and the statutory au-
thority of such public employer to make particular decisions, the courts 
of the commonwealth have substantial power to review arbitration 
awards issued under such agreements. During such review, a court 
does not pass on the correctness of the arbitrator's interpretation. In-
stead, it determines whether there is a non-contractual legal barrier to 
the enforcement of the award. 
This detailed review by the court would, at first glance, seem to be 
in direct conflict with the United States Supreme Court's Steelworkers 
16 ld. 
17 ld. at 1249, 389 N.E.2d at 975. 
IS ld. at 1248-49, 389 N.E.2d at 975. 
19 ]d.. 
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trilogy.1 Because freedom to contract in the private sector does not 
blanket public sector matters and because governmental interests and 
public policy are involved, it follows that in those cases where the 
arbitrator's interpretation of the bargaining agreement intrudes into an 
area specifically reserved by statute to the public employer or is in con-
flict with public policy, review by the courts is warranted. In these 
instances, the court determines whether the award of the arbitrator is 
consistent with governmental interests and public concerns. The court 
essentially is interpreting the law of the commonwealth, rather than the 
contract itself. As long as that review does not include a weighing of 
the merits of the grievance ora reinterpretation of the bargaining agree-
ment, but rather is limited to a determination of whether there is a non-
contractual bar to the enforcement of the award, there would seem to 
be no conflict with the Steelworkers trilogy. 
§13.6. 1 See § 1, text and notes at notes 5-7, supra. 
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